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1.  Introduction 
Meant to signal a transition away from market intervention by the U.S. government, the 1996 
Farm Bill replaced the traditional mechanisms of income support awarded on a per unit basis by 
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments, fixed annual lump-sum installments based on 
historical production. These payments, meant to decline each year until the expiration of the Act, 
were  expected  not  to  distort  production  or  trade,  and  so  be  consistent  with  the  market 
liberalization commitments agreed to in the Uruguay Round negotiations. But any perceptions 
that these payments were temporary were dismissed when the 2002 Farm Bill was passed by 
Congress, replacing PFC payments by Direct Payments (DP) (Goodwin and Mishra 2005). The 
bill also institutionalized the ad hoc Market Loss Assistance (MLA) payments in place in the late 
1990s  due  to  the  decline  in  world  commodity  prices  and  localized  yield  shortfalls,  making 
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) available when market prices went below the target levels 
defined in the legislation. Like PFC and DP, CCP were calculated using historical base acres and 
yields. Other highlights of the bill included the opportunity to update crop bases and, under some 
conditions and only for the purposes of CCP, yield bases.  
From the many controversial issues involved in the Congressional debate leading up to 
the 2002 Farm Bill, perhaps none was more contentious than the setting of tighter limits on the 
level of farm payments (Miller et al. 2003). This, however, did not happen, and the limits were 
continued from the previous bill (the limits per individual farmer were kept at $40,000 for DP, 
$65,000 for CCP and $75,000 for marketing loans, a total limit of $180,000, increased two-fold 
to $360,000 through the still in place “three-entity rule”).
1 Using a simulation approach similar to 
                                                 
1 Because there was no limit on the use of generic certificates (allowing unlimited LDP and marketing loan gains), 
$360,000 was not an effective cap. 3 
Hennessy (1998), Goodwin (2006) evaluated the effects of proposals to strengthen limits on 
acreage for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice in several important producing states under 
discussion in the Senate. Like in Miller et al. (2003), results suggested payment limits were 
unlikely to affect acreage decisions except for cotton and rice, where the probability that the 
limits would be binding was greater.
2 Indeed Hennessy’s work was paramount in showing how, 
in the presence of uncertainty, support policies deemed decoupled in a deterministic world affect 
the decisions of risk-averse producers so that they are not, in effect, decoupled. While Hennessy 
and  Goodwin  both  assumed  a  farmer  choosing  inputs  to  maximize  expected  utility  of  total 
profits, they did not consider the possibility of the farmer being unable to attain the desired level 
of inputs due to credit constraints. But studies have shown that farmers facing binding credit 
constraints  will  under-invest  relative  to  those  who  are  unconstrained  in  the  credit  market 
(Briggeman et al. 2008, Guirkinger and Boucher 2006). As such, further analysis on whether and 
by how much the presence of government payments distorts production decisions, and should 
stricter payment limitations matter for those decisions, ought to include the presence of capital 
market  imperfections,  or  credit  constraints.  Naturally,  the  probability  that  the  constraint  is 
binding should decrease with the increasing availability of signaling and/or screening devices.
3 
We  revisit  the  analysis  of  farmers’  optimal  resource  allocation  in  the  presence  of 
government payments, decoupled and not, and extend it to incorporate the optimal choice of 
investment levels in the presence of credit constraints. We further extend our theoretical model 
to allow for decreasing marginal yields and a wealth-dependent interest rate. We then use this 
                                                 
2 For these crops, government payments per acre are generally higher than for corn, soybeans or wheat. 
3 These include elements such as a positive credit history, the individual characteristics and skills of the borrower, a 
sufficiently  good  performance  and  satisfactory  risk  exposure  of  the  credit-funded  project.  Additionally,  the 
availability of collateral and the interest rate the farmer is willing to accept should also decrease the likelihood that 
the credit constraint is binding. 4 
framework to perform two analyses. First, we analyze the production effects of a 100 percent 
increase in DP for a credit constrained farmer. Second, we observe the production effects of 
more  stringent  payment  limits  on  FD,  CCP  and  LDP  such  as  those  proposed  by  Senators 
Grassley, Dorgan, Hagel, and Johnson in February of 2005.  
We proceed as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical framework that 
links the acreage and borrowing decisions to the financial conditions of the farm, namely the 
amount and type of government payments received. Along with the data, the following section 
discusses the simulation methods and the econometric techniques used to retrieve some of the 
variables necessary in the study. The results of the simulation for the general framework are then 
presented. The policy application is then performed using this extended model. Some concluding 
remarks are finally offered.  
2.  Conceptual framework 
The model assumes a representative farmer who must make land management decisions while 
facing unknown future values of prices and yields. For tractability we focus on single crop farms. 
Given  some  subjective  opinion  about  the  joint  distribution  of  prices  and  yields,  t P   and  t Y , 
respectively, and her initial endowment of land  t A  at time t, the farmer must choose δ , the ratio 
of planted acres to operated acres ( ) 0 1 δ ≤ ≤  so that  t t A A δ = , and  t B , the amount to borrow, to 
maximize her expected utility of wealth  t W , including changes brought about by discounted 
future expected profits. This is described by 
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where the utility function  [ ] U ⋅  is assumed to be twice differentiable and quasi-concave and β  is 5 
the discount rate.  
Wealth in period t is comprised by several categories of income, including market and 
government support-augmented income, along with initial liquidity and other sources of income. 
It consists of profits derived from production  t π , government payments  t GP , initial liquidity  0 W , 
and exogenous income  t OW . Because both prices and yields are not observed by the farmer 
when  production  decisions  are  made,  revenue  from  production  ( t t t PY A δ )  is  a  risky  variable. 
Alternatively, input prices and per acre costs ( jt ω , the per acre cost of input j and fixed costs 
t FC ) are known at the time crop acreages are allocated and the other relevant decisions are 
made. Implied in our profit function is the assumption that technology is linear in acreage and 
that marginal yields are constant in the neighborhood of the optimal level of acreage such that, 
all  else  equal,  an  additional  acre  will  generate  a  constant  addition  to  total  output.  This 
assumption is relaxed in a later section.  
Government  payments  include  Direct  Payments  ( t DP ),  Counter-Cyclical  Payments 
( t CCP) and Loan Deficiency Payments ( t LDP). DP, which do not depend on current market 
conditions but on historical base, are calculated using the payment rate  t rate DP , base acreage 
bacres , and base yield  byield . They are subject to the payment limit  lim DP , defined by the 
2002 Farm Bill. DP are given by  
(2)  ( ) t min lim,0.85 rate t DP DP DP bacres byield = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅     
Contrary to DP, CCP and LDP depend on market conditions, in particular prices, as they 
are available for covered commodities whenever the effective price is less than the target price. 
Like DP, CCP depend on historical acres and yields. CCP are given by  
(3)  ( ) t min lim, 0.85 rate t CCP CCP CCP bacres byield = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅     6 
where  t rate CCP  is the commodity’s payment rate given by  
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t rate max 0,  rate    max LR , P
T
t t CCP P DP = − −     
where  t
T P is the target price,  t LR  is the national loan rate, and  lim CCP  is the payment limit.  
Contrary to DP and CCP, LDP depend on current acreage, since they are a loan farmers 
receive per unit of production. LDP are given by  
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) min lim, max 0, t t t t t LDP LDP LLR P Y A δ = − ⋅ ⋅   
where  t LLR  is the local (county) loan rate,  lim LDP  is the payment limit, set by the Farm Bill, 
and  t A δ  is the number of acres put into production. Government payments can thus be rewritten 
as  ( ) ; , t t t t t GP GP A P Y δ = ,  which  emphasizes  their  dependence  on  market  conditions  and  the 
farmer’s acreage choice, in turn linked to borrowing, as we explain next.  
Farmers endowed with relatively little liquidity may ask for a loan to finance production. 
In this case, the maximum size of the loan depends on the both the borrower and the lender. We 
assume that in response to asymmetric information all loans are collateralized with the farmer’s 
wealth at the end of the lending period, so that the loan amount is bounded by the relative size of 
the debt the bank allows the farmer to incur. This implies the upper limit on the loan amount is a 
certain  fraction  of  the  farmer’s  wealth,  t W γ ,  where  0 1 γ ≤ ≤   is  the  allowable  debt  factor, 
depending on a number of features that typically characterize the financial profile of a potential 
borrower as viewed by the lending institution.
4 In addition to the limit on potential relative debt, 
the farmer also faces a credit cost that is increasing in the loan amount. We model this cost as 
                                                 
4 These features include the past relationship of the farmer with the lending institution, the level of assets of the farm 
(that can act as collateral) and/or the level of liabilities, the number of years the farm has been in business, and the 
characteristics of the proposed investment. 7 
t B α ,  where  0 1 α ≤ ≤   is  chosen  by  the  lender  to  reflect  the  financial  characteristics  of  the 
borrower. This cost decreases the farmer’s level of wealth. We begin by modeling this cost as 
independent of wealth but relax this assumption later.  
Before we move on to presenting the farmer’s optimization problem there are two issues 
that need to be clarified. These relate to the temporal aspects of the model. First, this is a model 
of farmers’ behavior in a single period. It is not a model of farm dynamics. The model describes 
the moment in time when the farmer is making the decision of how many acres to plant and how 
much  money  to  borrow  with  only  an  expectation  about  future  prices  and  yields  (and 
consequently  government  payments).  The  second  issue  that  needs  to  be  clarified  is  the 
information  known  by  the  agents  in  this  model  at  the  moment  the  loan  is  negotiated.  As 
mentioned, the farmer has only a subjective opinion about future prices and yields when she goes 
to bank to borrow to expand acreage. We assume the lender has the same expectation about 
future prices and yields, i.e. market returns, as the farmer and so evaluates the farmer’s expected 
wealth at the end of the lending period to judge her credit worthiness, whether to lend, and how 
much to lend at the beginning of the period.
5  
With this background, the farmer’s optimization problem of choosing  δ  and  t B  given 
unknown future values of prices and yields is characterized by equations (6) to (10).  
(6) 
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subject to 
                                                 
5 This symmetry may arise for a number of reasons. For example, the farmer may prepare a budget describing the 
uses of funds and expected market conditions at the time she asks for the loan. Or the bank’s experience in granting 
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(9)  t t W B γ ≥ , 0 1 γ ≤ ≤  
(10)  t t A A δ ≤ , 0 1 δ ≤ ≤    
Equation (7) is a statement of the wealth level of the farmer, which depends on initial 
liquidity  o W   and  exogenous  income  t OW ,  unknown  market  returns  minus  known  costs 
1
J
t t jt t t
j
PY A FC ω δ
=
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  ∑ , government payments  ( ) ; , t t t t GP A P Y δ  and the cost of credit  t B α .  
Equation (8) is the budget constraint, limiting expenditures on inputs to the value of the 
farmer’s  liquidity  plus  borrowing.  This  constraint  can  be  thought  of  as  a  “cash  on  hands” 
constraint,  limiting  production  to  the  farmer’s  ability  to  cover  variable  costs  when  planting 
decisions are made.  
Equation (9) is the credit constraint, rationing the amount of the loan the farmer can 
request. The farmer is credit constrained if the amount of the loan she would like to borrow is 
greater than the fraction of wealth the lender specifies as the maximum debt allowed. We further 
allow the borrowing amount to be negative. While we specifically calibrate the amount of initial 
liquidity  to  avoid  the  situation  when  the  farmer  has  more  liquidity  than  she  can  spend  on 
production, poor market conditions could in principle induce the farmer not to produce and set 
operated acres to fallow. We address this issue in greater detail in the next section. Finally, 
equation (10) simply states the farmer cannot allocate more land to production than her initial 
endowment. 
Given  this  framework,  we  can  now  explore  the  interaction  between  the  farmer’s 
endowments, the credit constraints, and the various types of government payments set by policy. 9 
Recall that government payments vary with current acreage choices solely when prices are low, 
specifically if they are lower than the loan rates. We begin by solving the budget constraint with 
respect to borrowing and substituting this into the cost of credit term in the wealth expression. To 
avoid clutter let 
* *
t t A A δ = , where 
* δ  is the optimum ratio of planted to total acreage. At the 
optimum, the level of wealth given planted acreage and borrowing is given by  
(11)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
* * * *
1
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which can be thought of as support- and other sources of income-augmented profit function, 
depending  fundamentally  on  the  variable  of  choice  and  the  parameters  of  the  model.  For  a 
nonnegative level of planted acres, the wealth maximizing condition for an optimum is given by 
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which  implies  acres  will  be  put  into  production  if  expected  market  returns  and  government 
payments cover the borrowing-cost-augmented variable production costs. We now describe the 
three thresholds of interest that may arise. This description will help clarify the role government 
payments may play in affecting the farmer’s choices.  
The first threshold occurs when expected market returns and government payments are 
insufficient to cover the borrowing cost augmented variable production costs. This scenario is 
associated with expected very bad yields, very low prices, or both. In this case the farmer will 
choose to set all her land aside and not produce. No borrowing will take place. On the contrary, 
the  farmer  should  save.  The  second  threshold  involves  positive  market  returns  greater  than 
variable costs but smaller than the borrowing cost augmented variable production costs. In this 
scenario, the farmer will choose to put all her acreage she can afford based on initial income into 
production, but again not to borrow. However, if prices are low enough that LDP should be in 10 
place,  these  payments  may  be  used  to  cover  borrowing  costs  and  some  positive  amount  of 
borrowing may take place. In the first and second cases, the borrowing constraint is unlikely to 
be binding. Finally, the last threshold involves a situation when market returns are sufficiently 
high to cover production and borrowing costs. The farmer will put all her acres into production 
and borrow so as to finance expanding acreage, the limit to this expansion being the borrowing 
cost and credit constraint. In this setting, it is unlikely that coupled government payments have 
acreage effects, because a situation of high market returns will probably be associated with high 
prices. However, even if the only government transfers the farmer is receiving are DP, with are 
independent of current acreage, the increase in wealth increases the credit limit, thereby making 
the credit constraint to be less limitative. We now turn to the application of this model and 
observe the impact of different levels of liquidity and credit limits upon the farmer’s acreage and 
borrowing decisions in the presence of credit constraints. 
3.  Modeling issues 
We model a sole-operator producing winter wheat in Kansas. Following Goodwin (2006) and 
Hennessy  (1998)  we  use  a  utility  function  that  is  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  different 
degrees of risk aversion. This utility function, first suggested by Pratt (1964), and a modification 
of the negative exponential form, has the desirable property that risk aversion recedes toward 
zero as wealth becomes very large. The utility function is given by  
(13)  [ ]
t W
t t U W e W
λ β
− = − +   
where { } λ β, ,  0 > β  are the parameters characterizing this function. An advantage of this utility 
function is its ability to accommodate different risk preferences, such as Constant Absolute Risk 
Aversion (CARA) or DARA preferences; for example, if preferences are assumed to be CARA, 11 
0 = β . This allows us to experiment with different degrees of risk aversion in our calculation of 
optimal  acreage  and  borrowing  choices.  Following  Goodwin  (2006)  we  set 
4 1 10 λ
− = ×   and 
5 9 10 β
− = × . The coefficient of  absolute risk aversion associated with this utility function is 
given by  














   
The  farmer  is  making  acreage  and  borrowing  decisions  while  facing  unknown  future 
values of prices and yields. For a given number of random draws N, and letting i refer to the ith 
realization of prices and yields, the expected utility function is given by 
(15)  ( )
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which  highlights  the  dependence  of  expected  utility  on  the  parameters  underlying  the  joint 
distribution of prices and yields. We simulate a large number (10,000) of correlated, random, 
log-normally  distributed  prices  and  Beta-distributed  yields  and  define  the  objective  and 
constraint  functions  in  terms  of  these  simulated  values.  We  choose  the  ratio  of  planted  to 
operated acres  δ  and borrowing  t B  that maximize this function for the simulated correlated 
price-yield pairs.  
Aside from conducting the experiment for different levels of payment limits, we alter 
some parameters of the model to allow us to observe the sensitivity of the solution to the degree 
to which the farmer is credit constrained. In particular, we experiment with different levels of 
initial  liquidity  and  allowable  debt.  These  variables  are  inextricably  linked  to  the  financial 
condition of the farmer, and so to her access to credit. We also carry out our experiment for six 
different scenarios for costs, prices, yields and preferences. The first scenario is the baseline. The 
second scenario depicts a low cost situation, when production costs and rents are 60 percent of 12 
those in the baseline. In the third scenario, in addition to the low cost environment, prices are 60 
percent lower than in the baseline. This scenario should imply greater CCP than the previous. 
The fourth scenario maintains the low cost environment but prices are 140 percent higher than 
those in the baseline. In the fifth scenario the environment is one of low costs, rents, and prices, 
but  yields  are  above  average  by  140  percent;  this  scenario  should  result  in  the  greatest 
governmental transfers. The sixth scenario is one of low costs, rents and prices, but preferences 
are  assumed  to  be  CARA  (so  0 β = ).  All  else  constant,  these  varying  circumstances  let  us 
observe three things. First, allowing for different cost and risk preferences scenarios allows us to 
potentially characterize farmers with different cost structures and/or different behaviors towards 
risk. Second, we are able to observe how the degree to which a farmer is credit constrained 
affects her optimal choices of acreage and borrowing under different market conditions. Finally, 
we are able to observe how the optimal values interact with market conditions and ultimately 
result in different levels of government payments.  
There is a long-standing belief in the literature that crop yields are skewed, and possibly 
bimodal. Skewness in yields is expected due to adverse weather conditions and because of the 
biological constraints that naturally limit the maximum yields attainable during any given year. 
At the individual farm level, skewness may also depend on chemical applications, soils, and the 
investment in harvest equipment, all of which reduce the risk of extremely low yields. Because it 
can  exhibit  both  negative  and  positive  skewness,  the  Beta  distribution  is  often  used  in  the 
literature, and it is the distribution chosen to model yields in this study. The Beta probability 
density distribution is given by equation (16), where yields were scaled to lie in the unit interval 
by defining the maximum possible yield as 150 percent of the average yield 13 
(16)  ( )
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where { } , α β  are the parameters of the distribution and  ( ) , B α β  is the Beta function appearing 
as a normalization constant to guarantee the total probability integrates to unity. We discuss this 
matter further in the next section, where the data are presented. 
While the exact magnitude of price-yield correlation varies depending on the level of 
analysis, prices of agricultural products tend to be high when yields are low, and vice-versa. For 
a particular farm, yields and prices need not be related because the output of that farm should not 
affect prices in a noticeable manner. For a region or a state, however, since yields of individual 
farms tend to be positively correlated, they also tend to be correlated with prices. Like Goodwin 
(2006) we assume that correlation to be -0.2 at the state level and use this to convert random 
draws from a multivariate normal distribution with a known degree of correlation to Beta and 
log-normal random draws with known correlation. Prices are assumed to follow a log-normal 
distribution. We now discuss the data used to model our simulation to reflect the acreage and 
borrowing decisions of a wheat grower in Kansas in 2004.  
4.  Data 
The data come from a variety of sources, as information is required on prices, yields, production 
costs, government policy parameters, and other relevant factors. Because we are trying to model 
a Kansas farmer, we use farm-level records from the Kansas Farm Management Association 
(KFMA). The KFMA farms are full-time commercial operations, which are mainly farms with 
gross sales exceeding $100,000. Of the 61,593 farms counted in the 1997 Agricultural Census, 
13,436  farms  had  gross  sales  exceeding  that  number  (21.81  percent).  The  KFMA  farms 
represent, according to Albright (2001), the various farming areas and farm types in Kansas. The 14 
model refers to 2004, the second year of the 2002 Farm Bill. We start by discussing the variables 
that are taken from these data and then move on to describing the other data sources along with 
the assumptions we use.  
Some summary statistics describing the KFMA data appear in Table 1. There were 577 
farms in our sample. These farms produced wheat during 2004 and also during the years 1998-
2001, the reference period for base updates allowed by the 2002 Farm Bill. All nominal variables 
were converted to real terms by dividing by the Production Price Index for All Commodities 
published by Bureau of Labor Statistics, (2004=100).  
Table 1. Key variables for selected KFMA farms, 2004 
Variables Average St. Dev Median
Total acres operated 1,872.11 1,335.58 1,520.00
Owned operated acres 592.66 757.54 325.00
Total cropacres 1,430.13 1,079.94 1,165.00
Owned cropacres 435.27 590.43 239.00
Total wheat acres 532.73 456.71 415.00
Owned wheat acres 150.93 235.35 72.00
Yield (bu/acre) 40.02 14.80 42.92
Wheat base acres 408.20 309.93 348.67
Wheat base yield (bu/acre) 34.34 7.11 34.79
Average 98-01 wheat acres 515.60 411.65 427.98
Average 98-01 wheat yield  (bu/acre) 44.01 8.32 44.10
Lagged Net Worth ($1,000) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt to asset ratio 0.1781 0.1944 0.1335
Number of farms 577
 
As expected, acres variables of the median farm are lower than those of the average farm; 
in order to avoid the upward distortions brought about by the fact that there are a few very large 
farms in the data, we use the median farm as our reference. Total operated acres, the maximum 
number of acres the farmer can operate is then set at 1,520 acres. This variable, along with all the 
other variables used to calibrate the model, is described in Table 2. About one quarter of total 
operated acres is devoted to growing crops. For the average farmer, wheat accounts for nearly 40 15 
percent of total planted acres.  
Table 2. Parameters for simulation 
Value
Utility function parameters
Lambda (Utility function)  1.00E-04




Maximum yield (bu) 60
Price volatilities 0.21
Farm wealth, costs and allowable debt
Initial (and maximum) total operated acres  1,520
Initial exogenous income
   Scenario 1: low liquidity ($) 24,439.88
   Scenario 2: average liquidity ($) 48,879.76
   Scenario 3: high liquidity ($) 73,319.64
Other sources of income 200,000.00
Debt factor
   Scenario 1: low allowable debt 0.13
   Scenario 2: high allowable debt 0.25
Cost of credit 0.05
Variable costs ($ per acre) 41.91
Rents ($ per acre) 59.8
Fixed costs ($ per acre) 102.76
Policy variables
DP limit ($) 40,000
CCP limit ($) 60,000
LDP limit ($) 150,000
Base acres – KFMA 428
Base yield – KFMA 44
FDP rate 0.52
Harvest national price ($) 3.19
Harvest state price ($) 3.00
Target price ($) 3.92
National loan rate (for CCP) 2.75
Local (county) loan rate (for LDP)  2.89
Variable
 
Because the 2002 Farm Bill allowed for base acres to be updated, and for those farmers 
who did so by adjusting them to reflect the 1998-2001 period, yield base for the purposes of 
calculating CCP could also be updated, we calculated the average wheat acres and yields for that 
reference period. For both the average and the median farmer, we found the 1998-2001 average 
acres and yields were greater than the 1996 Farm Bill acre and yield bases. And while average 
yields for the KFMA farms seem to have increased by almost 27 percent over the period, they 16 
are only slightly above the 43.25 bu/acre average for the state. Because the updated bases would 
imply greater CCP, we assume the farmer in our model chose to update her bases to the 1998-
2001 values. Since the Farm Bill only allowed the base yield update to be used in the calculation 
of CCP, and even so only 93.5 percent of the 1998-2001 average yields could be used, we revise 
the CCP equation as  
(4.17)  ( ) t 98 01 98 01 min lim, 0.85 rate 0.935. t CCP CCP CCP bacres byield − − = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅     
where  98 01 bacres −  and  98 01 byield −  are the 1998-2001 acres and yields averages, respectively. 
There is an assortment of statistical approaches to represent yield distributions; these can 
be  divided  into  two  broad  categories,  depending  upon  whether  they  draw  on  a  parametric 
distribution or whether they draw on nonparametric techniques. Most studies that recover the 
distribution of agricultural yields employ parametric methods, differing mainly in their choice of 
parent distribution. Each distribution has its merits, and as Ozaki et al. (2006) pointed out, “the 
characteristics  of  crop  yields  may  be  idiosyncratic  and  may  vary  by  location,  crop,  and 
production practice. Thus, it is unlikely that any single parametric approach will be universally 
supported across different applications.” (p. 5). Because of its ability to deal with skewness, we 
use the Beta distribution to estimate the parameters underlying the yield distribution.  
State-level  yield  data  for  Kansas  from  1970  to  2004  were  used  to  model  our  yield 
distribution; these data are readily available online from USDA. As in Goodwin (2006), the data 
were detrended by assuming that yields over the period are dominated by a linear trend and that 
deviations from the trend should be proportional to the trend. We regressed yields on time to 
obtain predicted yields  ˆt y  and deviations from the trend  ˆ ˆ / t t e y . Yields were then re-centered on 
the predicted yield for 2004 using  2004 ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 / ) t t t y e y y = + ɶ . This specification is common to some 
crop insurance products such as the Group Risk Plan. Estimation using Maximum likelihood 17 
found  13.84 α =  and  6.92 β = , and a goodness of fit Chi-squared test had a p-value of 0.8726, 
so the appropriateness of the distribution was not rejected by the data. Because state-level data 
were used to estimate these parameters, and farm-level yields are expected to be show greater 
variability than more aggregated data, we added a normally-distributed random shock to each 
replicated state-average yield; these shocks have zero mean and variance equal to 75 percent of 
the standard deviation of the detrended state average yield series.  
Price volatilities are average historical values taken from unpublished data reported by 
the Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Commodity Exchange. These volatilities are 
taken from Goodwin (2006) as are rents, variable costs and fixed costs, which came from the 
State Extension Services from Kansas, and state and national average prices. We defer to the 
original paper for an overview of the methods employed to recover these values. Because fixed 
costs are on a per acre basis, we multiplied the total endowment of land by this cost to generate 
the final value used in the application.  
We  model  three  different  cases  for  the  initial  liquidity  of  the  farmer.  These  cases 
represent 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of the amount necessary to put the farmer’s land 
endowment into production in the low cost scenarios ($92,759.52).
6 To see why we impose the 
low cost scenario, consider the following. When deciding how many acres to produce and how 
much money to borrow, the farmer is matching sources and uses of funds so that the equality of 
the budget constraint always holds. In terms of the optimum use of her endowment of land three 
situations may arise. First, the farmer may have enough liquidity put all her land into production. 
This is the case if her liquidity is equal to at least the endowment of land times variable costs. In 
                                                 
6 Total variable costs per acre (rents plus variable costs) are $41.91+59.8=$101.71 in the baseline scenario, and 
$61.026 in the low cost scenarios. Putting all operated acres into production would then cost $154,599.2 in the 
baseline scenario or $92,759.52 in the low cost scenario.  18 
this situation, the farmer does not borrow. She does not need to if she decides to put all her land 
into production (whether she does depends on expected prices and yields). Second, the farmer 
may have some amount of initial liquidity, but not enough to cover putting all her land into 
production. If this is the case, and depending on the expectation about futures prices and yields, 
she may choose to put as much land to production as she can by using a combination of her own 
funds and borrowing or simply  by using her own funds. Finally, if the farmer’s liquidity is 
greater than the cost of putting all her land into production, she cannot apply that extra liquidity 
into production and must save. Since our goal is to model a credit constrained farmer, the first 
and third possibilities are not interesting and we give the farmer less liquidity than that required 
to put all her land into production. Given the upper bound defined above we define the low 
liquidity level as  0,1 W =$23.189,88, the average liquidity level as  0,2 W =$46,379.76, and the high 
liquidity level as  0,3 W =$69,569.64 .  
The allowable debt factor represents the proportion of wealth the farmer is allowed to 
borrow. KFMA debt to asset ratios serve as reference values for this parameter. The average debt 
to asset ratio (about 17 percent) is above that of the median farm (about 13 percent) and the 
farmer on the 25 percentile has a debt to asset ratio of about 5 percent, while that on the 75 
percentile has a debt to asset ratio of about 25 percent. We observe how the optimal solution 
changes as we first set the percentage debt factor to that of the median farm, so that  1=0.13 γ , and 
then set the factor to that of the farmer on the 75 percentile, so that  2=0.25 γ .  
Like initial liquidity, the choice of the amount of the other farm income variable requires 
some attention to the condition that the farmer is credit constrained. If, for example, we set this 
value  to  that  of  the  lagged  net  farm  income  of  the  median  farmer  ($1,089.68  thousand), 
excluding other sources of income such as government payments, and considering the lowest 19 
allowable debt factor of 0.13, the farmer can borrow up to $141.64 thousand. This means that, at 
the lowest level of liquidity ($23.19 thousand), the credit constraint is not binding and the farmer 
can afford to plant all her acres by borrowing. This led us to set the variable at $200 thousand. 
Since the credit constraint is not binding for the higher liquidity case, this allows us to observe 
the different optimal choices under the credit constrained and unconstrained cases. Finally, the 
policy variables such as the DP rate, payment limits, target price and the national loan rate came 
from the 2002 Farm Bill.  
5.  Simulation results 
This section presents the results from the simulation, which we perform for different values of 
liquidity and allowable debt. Furthermore, each of our experiments is performed for six different 
scenarios. In each scenario we take 10,000 random draws of correlated prices and yields. The 
first scenario is the baseline, and the second to fifth scenarios vary in their treatment of costs, 
prices, and yields; as in Goodwin (2006), our baseline scenario uses the costs taken from the 
state crop budgets and assumes the 2004 state harvest-time price as a mean value for expected 
prices. The sixth scenario differs from the previous in its assumption about risk preferences. 
Table 3 summarizes the parameterization of the different scenarios. 
Table 3. Simulation scenarios 
Scenarios Description  Costs Prices Yield Preferences
1 Baseline scenario Baseline Baseline Baseline DARA
2 Low costs 60 % of baseline Baseline Baseline DARA
3 Low costs and prices 60 % of baseline 60% of baseline Baseline DARA
4 Low costs, high prices 60 % of baseline 140% of baseline Baseline DARA
5 Low costs and prices, high yields 60 % of baseline 60 % of baseline 140% of baseline DARA
6 Low costs and prices, and CARA preferences 60 % of baseline 60 % of baseline Baseline CARA
 
Note: Baseline values for prices and yields are those generated by the correlated log-normal and Beta distributions. 
Parameters for these distributions and baseline values for costs are described in Table 2.  
We expect increasing levels of liquidity to increase the number of acres planted. The 20 
effect of liquidity on borrowing depends on the degree to which the farmer is constrained by 
credit. To understand why note that, all else constant, higher levels of liquidity imply a lesser 
need for borrowing in order to finance current production. So, for the farmer who is not credit 
constrained, higher levels of liquidity unequivocally lead to less borrowing. However, for the 
farmer who is credit constrained, higher levels of liquidity also imply greater wealth, which in 
turn enhances the farmer’s ability to borrow. In this case, higher levels of liquidity should lead to 
more borrowing. Because we can follow the farmer’s decisions for different levels of allowable 
debt  for  a  given  level  of  liquidity,  and  for  different  levels  of  liquidity  for  a  given  level  of 
allowable  debt,  we  can  observe  the  production  effects  of  lessening  the  degree  to  which  the 
farmer is constrained by credit and those of increasing her liquidity. Finally, greater wealth could 
further induce positive production effects via its effect on risk aversion. This was shown by 
Sandmo (1971), who suggested that under DARA preferences, increases in wealth should make 
producers more willing to take on risk and increase production. 
The second scenario assumes all production costs and rents are 60 percent of the levels 
reported in the crop budget. These lower costs could represent, for example, farms that are more 
efficient or that have lower rents. We expect optimal acreage and borrowing to be higher than in 
the baseline. In addition to low production costs, the third scenario assumes market prices are 60 
percent of those in the previous scenarios. This reduction in marginal returns for a given level of 
yields  causes  the  acreage  and  borrowing  decisions  to  be  especially  sensitive  to  government 
payments, namely the coupled type. Indeed, we expect CCP and LDP to be high in this scenario, 
as both types of payments are triggered by prices falling beneath the target level. The fourth 
scenario has low costs and high prices. Specifically, we assume prices are 140 percent of their 
levels in the baseline scenario. While we expect production to expand relative to the previous 21 
scenarios, this level of prices should lead to much smaller LDP and CCP payments than in all 
previous scenarios, especially the third. The fifth scenario still uses low costs and prices, but 
yields are assumed to be 140 percent of the baseline. As in the previous scenario, higher returns 
should expand production. Additionally, the combination of low prices and high yields should 
bring about the greatest value in government payments, as LDP depend both on current prices 
and yields. Finally, the sixth scenario, while similar to the third scenario in terms of low costs 
and  prices,  assumes  that  utility  is  CARA  ( 0 β = ).  From  equation  (14)  this  implies 
( )
4
t W 10 ρ λ
− = = .  How  the  optimal  acreage  and  borrowing  decisions  compare  to  those  in 
scenario 3 under our assumption of DARA depends greatly on the value taken by the absolute 
risk aversion coefficient, which in turn depends on the level of wealth. Following Sandmo (1971) 
we expect a greater level of absolute risk aversion to lead to a lower level of production.  
5.A.  Acreage and borrowing decisions in the presence of credit constraints 
Tables A.1 through A.6 (in the Appendix) report the simulation results. In each table, along with 
the optimal acreage and borrowing decisions, we report the average and standard deviation of 
final wealth, payment receipts (DP, CCP and LDP), yields, and prices.
7 
Table A.1 reports the results for the baseline scenario. The interaction of costs, expected 
prices and yields, and DARA preferences keeps optimal acreage under the farmer’s endowment 
for all levels of liquidity. Beginning with the lowest level of liquidity and allowable debt, the 
farmer puts only 299 acres to production, borrowing $7,224. DP receipts are $9,793, well below 
their limit of $40,000; because they depend on historical acres and yields, these payments are the 
                                                 
7 For each scenario and under each level of liquidity and allowable debt, we also calculated the average risk aversion 
coefficient and the number of DP, CCP, and LDP limit hits (the number of replications the limit on the specific 
payment was reached). These results are not shown but are available upon request. 22 
same  across  all  scenarios  and  liquidity  and  allowable  debt  levels.  CCP  receipts  are  slightly 
higher, $10,597; except when price conditions vary (scenarios 3 and 4), these payments remain 
unchanged across all scenarios, and across liquidity levels within scenarios. The farmer receives 
$2,497 in LDP; as acres change across the scenarios, and across levels of liquidity or allowable 
debt within scenarios, the relative change in these payments equals that of acres. When liquidity 
doubles to $46,380, both borrowing and acres increase, by 11.97 percent and by 79.09 percent, 
respectively.  The  increase  in  payments  allowed  by  the  additional  liquidity  and  borrowing, 
combined with the additional liquidity, increase wealth by about $29,269, or 30.09 percent. The 
direction of the effects is very similar to when liquidity further increases to its highest level, but 
the magnitude is smaller. This is a credit constrained farmer. When allowed to borrow a greater 
percentage of her wealth, borrowing and acres both increase. Relative to the low allowable debt 
case,  borrowing  increases  by  77.97  percent  across  all  liquidity  levels  and  acres  increase  by 
between 8.89 and 18.52 percent in the high and low liquidity cases, respectively; the increased 
ability to borrow increases farmer’s wealth by about 1 percent. Overall our results allow us to 
observe the following. First, increases in liquidity increase both borrowing and acres. And as 
liquidity  increases,  the  magnitude  of  the  relative changes  in  borrowing  and  acres  decreases. 
Second, allowing the farmer to borrow a greater portion of her wealth allows her to expand 
production. Both of these changes bring about additional LDP receipts, further increasing wealth. 
Finally, the observed increases in production are consistent with those expected under DARA 
preferences.  
Table A.2 reports the results for the low cost scenario (scenario 2). Low costs, set at 60 
percent of those in the baseline scenario, boost the farmer’s overall liquidity, allowing her to 
plant and borrow more than before. For the lowest level of allowable debt, acres increase by 23 
between  87.05  percent  and  112.58  percent  and  borrowing  increases  by  between  115.96  and 
107.26 percent, for the lowest and highest levels of liquidity, respectively. Both these ranges 
increase for the higher level of allowable debt. In the high liquidity case, allowing the farmer to 
borrow a greater percentage of her wealth finally allows her to put all her acres into production. 
She actually borrows a lesser amount than in the average liquidity case, suggesting she is no 
longer credit constrained. As expected, wealth is generally greater under this scenario. 
Table A.3 reports the results for the low cost and low price scenario (scenario 3), where 
both prices and costs are set at 60 percent of the baseline. Price per bushel is now at around 
$1.80. Compared to the low cost scenario (scenario 2), both acres and borrowing increase despite 
the price decrease. This positive production effect is explained by the increase in the coupled 
elements  of  support  CCP  and  LDP,  triggered  by  prices  falling  below  the  target  level. 
Additionally, across all levels of liquidity and allowable debt, CCP increase by 64.05 percent, 
and because they depend on current production, LDP increase between 431 percent and 443 
percent, for the high and low levels of liquidity, respectively. This range, which corresponds to 
the high level of allowable debt case, is slightly higher than that of the low level allowable debt 
case. Under these poor price conditions, LDP limits are reached, and the number of times this 
happens increases with the farmer’s liquidity and ability to borrow. When the farmer is allowed 
to borrow up to 13 percent of her wealth, the limit is reached in 1 percent of the replications in 
the high level of liquidity case, but when she is allowed to borrow up to 25 percent of her wealth, 
LDP limits are reached in the average and high levels of liquidity. Indeed, when the farmer is 
endowed with the highest level of liquidity, the number of times the limit is reached more than 
doubles relative to that in the low allowable debt case. Finally, despite the government outlays, 
wealth is slightly lower than in scenario 2. 24 
Table A.4 reports the results for the low cost and high prices scenario (scenario 4), where 
prices are set at 140 percent of the baseline, about $4.2/bu. This scenario should bring about the 
smallest amount of coupled support. In fact, when compared to the low cost scenario (scenario 
2), and across both levels of allowable debt, CCP decrease by 78.84 percent in the low and high 
levels of liquidity cases and by 33.60 percent in the average level of liquidity case; LDP decrease 
by about 94 and 76 percent for those levels of liquidity, respectively. Despite the decrease in the 
coupled amount of support, the increase in revenue is enough to increase wealth, though this 
increase is very small in magnitude, about 1 percent. Interestingly, the 140% percent increase in 
prices  boosts  planted  acres  in  the  average  and  high  liquidity  cases  relative  to  the  low  price 
scenario (scenario 3), but not in the low liquidity case, where planted acres decrease by about 3 
acres in the low allowable debt case, and remain unchanged in the higher allowable debt case. 
Table  A.5  reports  the  results  for  the  low  cost  and  prices,  and  high  yields  scenario 
(scenario 5). Prices are back to the level defined in the third scenario, where expected coupled 
government outlays were at their maximum. Because CCP depend on historical bases, given that 
expected prices are the same across these scenarios, so is their value. On the contrary, LDP are 
determined by current production, so that the combination of better yields and low prices results 
in a much higher level of payments. These increase as higher liquidity and higher allowable debt 
permit the farmer to put more land into production. The payment limit on LDP is reached the 
greatest number of replications under these cost, price, and yield conditions. For the highest level 
of liquidity, the limit on LDP is reached about 8 to 9 percent of the replications. This number is 
slightly lower for the average liquidity case, varying between 0.22 percent and 3 percent of the 
replications, for the lower and higher levels of allowable debt, respectively. Stricter payment 
limitations should have their greatest impact in this scenario.  25 
Finally, and again maintaining the assumption of low costs and prices as in scenario 3, 
Table A.6 reports the results where preferences are assumed to be CARA. The higher absolute 
risk aversion coefficient suggests the farmer will be less inclined to put acres into production. 
Indeed  she  uses  some  of  her  initial  liquidity  to  save.  Furthermore,  while  acres  increase  as 
liquidity increases, they do not respond to changes in allowable debt. This is consistent with the 
farmer’s inclination towards saving. Relative to scenario 3, in the low allowable debt case, acres 
decrease  by  between  42.12  percent  and  49.84  percent,  for  the  average  and  high  levels  of 
liquidity, respectively, and in the high allowable debt case by between 52.00 percent and 58.58 
percent, for the high and low levels of liquidity, respectively. Combined with the lower LDP 
proceeds, the lower profits from production explain the decrease in wealth across the scenarios.  
5.B.  Extensions 
This section extends our general framework. To relax the assumption that all acres are equal, we 
incorporate decreasing marginal yields into our model. We also allow for the level of wealth to 
affect  the  cost  of  credit.  Intuitively,  richer  borrowers  should  be  better  able  to  overcome  the 
signaling difficulties that arise in imperfect credit markets and obtain credit at better conditions. 
We begin by discussing the impact of changing our assumption regarding technology and then 
move on to discussing that of having a wealth-dependent interest rate. 
5.B.1.  Decreasing marginal productivity of acres 
So far, our framework assumes all acres are equal in the sense that yields are stable across space. 
This assumption is unrealistic, as heterogeneity of various factors within the field should cause 
yields to vary. For example, differing soil moisture content or irregular fertilizer application 
should cause yields to differ across individual fields within a farm. We now assume that acres 26 
differ in their productivity. Furthermore, we assume that the farmer knows the productivity of 
her field and opts to put the most productive acres into production first.  
The assumption of decreasing marginal yields enters our model by multiplying the Beta-
distributed randomly drawn yield  t yield  by a correction factor. This correction factor acts as a 
“penalty” function, such that the new, acres-dependent yield 
P
t yield  is given by 




t t t yield yield A τ τ = −     
where  t t A A δ =  are the previously defined number of acres produced, and  0 0 τ >  and  1 0 1 τ ≤ ≤  
are parameters. This function implies that as more acres are added to production, yields decrease 
at a decreasing rate; note that if  0 1 τ =  and  1 0 τ =  we are back to the general framework.  
We calibrate parameters  0 τ  and  1 τ  to reflect some of the characteristics of our data. In 
particular, they satisfy the following two conditions. First, at the value of acres the farmer is 
endowed with, the acres-dependent value of yield is 80 percent of the Beta-distributed randomly 
drawn yield. Second, at the average number of acres planted by the KFMA farms that grew 
wheat in the 1998-2001 years, there is no “penalty”, and 
P
t t yield yield = , or 
2
0 1 1 t A τ τ − = . This 
generates a system of two equations in two unknowns with a single solution at  1 7.70E 08 τ = −  
and  0 1.0219 τ = . Relative to the general framework, representing yields in this manner gives the 
farmer an incentive to add acres until the KFMA average is reached, while penalizing her if that 
threshold is passed. Because in all but the low liquidity, low allowable debt case in the baseline 
scenario, optimal acres are greater than the KFMA average, we expect planted acres to be above 
those of the general framework in the low liquidity level in the baseline scenario, and below 
those of the general framework in the average and high levels of liquidity in the baseline scenario 
and for all liquidity levels in the other scenarios.  27 
The effects of acknowledging that not all acres are equal are as expected.
8 For the case 
when in the general framework acres are below the KFMA average, in the low liquidity level 
case in the baseline scenario, acres, borrowing, and wealth expand. For both levels of allowable 
debt, these variables increase by about 0.06 percent, 0.24 percent, and 0.61 percent, respectively. 
For the average and high liquidity levels, since acres in the general framework are above the 
KFMA average, assuming decreasing marginal yields lowers acres, borrowing, and wealth in all 
but the sixth scenario, where the optimal decisions of the farmer do not change with the new 
assumption about technology. For the other scenarios, the greatest decrease occurs in the high 
allowable debt and liquidity case, where in the general framework the farmer was putting all 
acres into production. In the high allowable debt case, under low cost and price conditions, acres 
decrease by 6.32 percent, borrowing decreases by 25.29 percent, and wealth decreases by 9.51 
percent. Finally, the number of times the limit on LDP is reached is  also responsive to the 
change. For example in scenario 3, for this level of debt, the number of times the limit on LDP is 
reached decreases by 100 percent in the average liquidity scenario and by 95.65 percent in the 
high liquidity case. The decrease in scenario 5 is slightly smaller, of 80.51 percent and 76.67 
percent for those levels of liquidity, respectively.  
5.B.2.  Wealth-dependent cost of credit 
In general, market interest rates are assumed to reflect four elements: (1) a return to productive 
capital; (2) an adjustment in order to reflect a positive rate of time preference; (3) a premium for 
expected inflation, and (4) a risk premium (Goodwin and Mishra 2000). It is the last element, the 
risk premium, which would explain why at a point in time and for identical size and term loans, 
different  borrowers  face  different  interest  rates.  Different  borrowers  with  different  financial 
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profiles are expected to exhibit different degrees of creditworthiness and, consequently, represent 
different probabilities of default. Intuitively, individuals with greater levels of wealth or lower 
liabilities should have better credit profiles. This, in turn, could lead to lower interest rates.  
Recall from equation (7) that wealth is a function of initial and other sources of income, 
profits from production minus fixed costs, government payments, and the cost of credit, which 
we assumed to be independent of the level of wealth. However we can think of this cost as being 
composed by two elements, a fixed element  0 α  and a wealth-dependent element  ( ) t Wealth ψ , 
' 0 ψ < , so that the full cost of credit  t CC  is given by 
(19)  ( ) ( ) 0 t t t CC Wealth B α ψ = +    
where  t B  is the borrowing amount defined earlier. For simplicity, assume  ( ) t Wealth ψ  is linear 
in wealth, so that  ( ) t t Wealth Wealth ψ θ = ,  0 θ < . Now wealth is given by  
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which is necessarily greater than the level of wealth given by equation (7) because  0 θ < . We 
further require 1 0 B θ + ≠ . 
Using ARMS data for 1997, Goodwin and Mishra (2000) found that farms with higher 
levels of wealth appeared to have lower farm interest rates. These rates were also decreasing in 
the term of the loan, the degree of diversification of the farm, the experience of the operator, and 
the fact that the operator lived on the operation. On the contrary, higher levels of liabilities 
increased interest rates. Because of our inability to actually observe the interest rates paid by the 
farmers  using  the  KFMA  data,  we  turned  to  the  values  found  by  Goodwin  and  Mishra  to 
calibrate our wealth-dependent cost of credit element, and assumed that a $100,000 increase in 29 
wealth would lead to a decrease in the interest rate of 0.0865 percentage points.
9 Relative to the 
general framework, we expect acres to exhibit an increased sensitivity to changes in liquidity, as 
liquidity simultaneously finances production and adds to the wealth and collateral of the farmer. 
The effects on borrowing are not so clear. On the one hand, greater wealth implies a lower 
wealth-dependent cost of credit. On the other hand, the cost of credit is higher than before, which 
can deter the farmer from borrowing as much as in the general framework.  
Assuming a wealth-dependent interest rate has the expected results. The extra interest 
rate cost decreases acres, borrowing, LDP receipts, and wealth across both levels of allowable 
debt, across the different levels of liquidity, and across all scenarios except for the sixth. But the 
change is very small in magnitude. In the low allowable debt case, the biggest decrease in acres 
occurs in the fifth scenario for the low liquidity level, where acres decrease by 0.0061 percent. In 
the high allowable debt case, this decrease, also the greatest, is of 0.0149 percent. But the new 
credit cost assumption has no effect upon the farmer’s optimal decisions in the high liquidity and 
allowable  debt  case,  when  the  farmer  can  put  all  her  acres  into  production,  though  wealth 
decreases by about 0.02 percent. Finally, as liquidity increases from one level to the next, the 
relative increase in acres is greater under the wealth-dependent interest rate framework. But this 
general wealth effect is, as the other changes, very small and almost negligible in magnitude.  
6.  Policy applications 
As in Hennessy (1998) and Goodwin (2006), we use our extended framework to perform two 
policy applications. We first evaluate the impact of a 100 percent increase in DP on the decisions 
for how many acres to plant, how much to borrow, wealth, LDP payments, and the number of 
                                                 
9 In what the denominator in equation (20) is concerned, it will be positive for any amount of borrowing below 
$115,606,936.42, well above the value allowed in our simulation.  30 
times the limit on LDP payments was reached. We then move on to observe the impact of stricter 
payment limitations on these optimal choices.  
6.A.  Effects of doubling Direct Payments 
In spite of their designation, there are several potential mechanisms through which decoupled 
payments may have production effects, namely credit constraints. We have hypothesized that 
these  effects  could  happen  in  two  ways.  First,  they  could  be  used  to  finance  additional 
production investment. Second, they could improve the collateral of a liquidity constrained in 
need  of  borrowing  to  finance  current  production.  Our  framework  describes  the  latter.  The 
manner in which the farmer’s problem was modeled incorporates DP as enhancing the farmer’s 
wealth (see equation (7)), thereby increasing her ability to borrow (see equation (9)), but not her 
current liquidity (given by equation (8)). The addition of DP exclusively in equation (7) implies 
that any change in this term alters only the collateral of the farmer. We now examine the acreage 
and borrowing effects of a 100 percent increase in DP while holding everything else constant. 
We are not interested in the event that caused this change. However, we assume it was not 
caused by  a change in base acres or base  yields, since this would alter the amount of CCP 
received. Since our goal is to observe the production effect of this change, ceteris paribus, we 
just assume that DP doubled.  
Table A.7 and Table A.8 (in the Appendix) report the simulation results from doubling 
DP, from the initial value $9,792.64 to twice that, $19,585.28. The tables differ in the levels of 
allowable debt. We again report results for optimal acres and borrowing, wealth, LDP receipts, 
and in addition report the number of times the limit on these payments was reached. In each 
table, columns (1) and (2) refer to the low liquidity case, columns (3) and (4) refer to the average 
liquidity case, and columns (5) and (6) refer to the high liquidity case. And for each level of 31 
liquidity,  the  first  column  reports  the  results  from  the  original  level  of  DP,  and  the  second 
column reports the results from the doubled DP. There was no change to the number of times the 
CCP limit was reached and the new value assumed for DP still falls below the $40,000 limit for 
these payments. 
Under DARA preferences, for the combination of liquidity and allowable debt levels that 
cause the farmer to be credit constrained, our results reveal that decoupled payments do have 
production effects. In the low allowable debt case, acres increase by between 3.0 percent to 3.8 
percent in the low liquidity case, by between 1.8 percent and 2.1 percent in the average liquidity 
case, and by between 1.3 percent and 1.5 percent in the high liquidity case. In all these cases, the 
baseline  scenario  always  shows  the  greatest  change;  this  is  also  valid  for  borrowing,  which 
increases by 16.0 percent, 14.3 percent, and 13.0 percent for this scenario and across these three 
levels of liquidity, respectively, and by about 7 percent for the other scenarios. In Table A.8, in 
the high level of allowable debt, acres increase by between 4.0 percent and 5.7 percent for the 
low liquidity case, and by between 2.6 percent and 3.4 percent in the average liquidity case; the 
baseline scenario again depicts the greatest changes. Because in the high level of liquidity the 
farmer is not constrained by credit in the low cost scenarios, the additional collateral has no 
effects except for in the baseline scenario, where acres increase by 2.4 percent. The relative 
changes  in  wealth  are  very  similar  across  the  tables,  varying  between  5.1  percent  and  10.6 
percent in the low liquidity level, between 3.8 percent and 8.0 percent in the average liquidity 
level, and between 3.1 percent and 6.5 percent in the high liquidity case. Finally, the increase in 
the number of acres planted also brings about an expansion in both the amount of LDP payments 
received and in the number of replications in which the limit on these payments is reached. 
Under CARA preferences, however, doubling DP has no effects. 32 
Overall,  our  results  suggest  DP  have  production  effects.  Moreover,  these  effects  are 
exacerbated by the presence of credit constraints. Even though the farmer’s liquidity did not 
change, DP enhance the farmer’s collateral so that she can put more acres into production. 
6.B.  Production effects of stricter payment limits 
The usual argument set forth to tighten government payments is one of equity among farmers, as 
larger  farms  receive  the  bulk  of  these  payments.  Supporters  of  tighter  payments  claim  they 
facilitate  farm  consolidation,  raise  the  price  of  land,  and  put  smaller,  family-sized  farming 
operations at a competitive disadvantage. Aside from large farms, other controversial recipients 
of  the  payments  include,  among  others,  millionaire  and  businessman  Maurice  Wilder  and 
billionaire  businessman  David  Rockefeller.
10  Despite  the  fact  that  in  principle  farm  support 
programs  should  not  discriminate  among  recipients,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  politically 
difficult  to  justify  the  escalating  concentration  of  payments  to  a  few  large  farms  (and/or 
millionaires with other sources of income). Along with being extremely costly to the federal 
budget, this undermines the public support for farm subsidies. To alleviate the problem of non-
farmers  collecting  subsidies  and  income  supports,  the  2008  Farm  Bill  denies  commodity 
payments to individuals with non-farm income of more than $500,000 and discontinues DP for 
individuals with more than $750,000 in net farm income. But big payments go to big farms 
because  support  is  generally  tied  to  units  of  production.  Larger  farms  usually  have  greater 
historical acreage and thus receive larger payments.  
In February of 2005, Senators Grassley and Dorgan introduced Senate Bill 385, where 
they  proposed  DP,  CCP  and  LDP  payment  limits  to  be  reduced  to  $40,000,  $60,000,  and 
                                                 
10 See, for example, the article “Farm aid going to millionaires” by the Environmental Working Group, August 
2008, found in http://www.ewg.org/node/27007.  33 
$150,000, respectively, per farmer. We now evaluate the production effects of this measure. 
Relative to our general framework, the policy merely decreases the limit on CCP by $5,000. For 
the wheat farmer in our model, whose historical acres and  yields have caused CCP to vary 
between  $2,241.96  and  $17,384.65  in  the  high  price  and  low  price  scenarios,  respectively 
(scenarios 4 and 3), this policy change should not affect production. Indeed, this is the case. For 
the base yield assumed and the levels of prices implied in our scenarios, the lower payment limit 
for CCP could only be attained by a farmer with much higher base acres. For the average price in 
the baseline scenario, $3/bu, it would take a base of about 1,467 acres to reach the payment limit, 
and for the average price in the lower price level scenarios, $1.80, it would take a base of about 
2,348 acres to reach the payment limit (in principle, under the high price scenario, price, CCP 
should not be collected). Only very large farms have these base acres. In our KFMA data, the 
farm at the 90 percentile had a base acreage of 833 acres, and even the farm at the 95 percentile 
had a base acreage of 1,116 acres. Only the farm at the 99 percentile had a base acreage of 1,625 
acres, greater than the required minimum base acreage to reach the payment limit in the baseline 
price scenario. And out of the 914 acres in the sample, only nine farms had greater yield acreage 
(the maximum base was 2,471). These were, in general, very large farms. Six out of these nine 
farms operated more than 1,351 acres in 2004. According to the 2002 Census of Agriculture, out 
of the 24,236 farms that produced wheat in Kansas, 1,773 had 1,000 acres or more, about 7.3 
percent. Of these large farms, the vast majority was in the 1,000 to 1,999 category, 1,519 farms, 
or 6.3 percent of total Kansas farms. However, the 1,000 acres or more farms represent about 
32.77 percent of wheat growing Kansas acres. Given that large farms are expected to have large 
historical bases, while this tighter limit would presumably affect only a small number of farms, it 
could nonetheless represent non-negligible savings for the Federal budget. 34 
7.  Conclusions 
In 1998 Hennessy showed how, in the presence of uncertainty, decoupled payments may distort 
production. His framework was used by Goodwin (2006) to observe the acreage effects of more 
stringent payment limits. However none of these applications allowed for the optimal decisions 
of farmers to be constrained by their ability to obtain credit. This type of constraints, pervasive in 
agriculture, has been shown by empirical studies to cause under-investment in agriculture, and so 
should be included in the analysis. Furthermore, the literature has identified credit constraints as 
a potential coupling mechanism of decoupled payments. These may, when farmers are unable to 
obtain credit at all or under good conditions, provide liquidity to allow investment in production 
to occur, or enhance the farmers’ collateral such that better credit conditions can be attained. Our 
analysis filled in this gap, extending the framework used by these authors to incorporate the 
presence  of  capital  market  imperfections,  or  credit  constraints.  We  further  expanded  our 
framework  to  include  the  possibility  of  decreasing  marginal  yields  and  a  wealth-dependent 
interest  rate.  Our  use  of  several  liquidity  levels  and  degrees  of  credit-worthiness  (allowable 
debt), along with several cost, price, yields, and preferences scenarios allowed us to observe the 
optimal choices of farmers with different cost structures and different behaviors towards risk. We 
were also able to observe how these choices changed with market conditions and ultimately 
resulted in different levels of government payments, coupled and decoupled. 
We find that credit constraints matter. When the farmer is not endowed with enough 
liquidity to put all her acres into production, and the market conditions are such that she would 
like to do so, allowing her to borrow a greater percentage of her wealth expands acreage. For 
example,  in  the  baseline  scenario,  slackening  the  constraint  allowed  the  farmer  to  increase 
planted  acres  by  between  8.89  and  18.52  percent  in  the  high  and  low  liquidity  cases, 35 
respectively. When she is not constrained by credit, decoupled payments only affect her wealth – 
this could potentially bring about other distortions in production than those considered in this 
study, as general wealth effects have been identified as another potential coupling mechanism.  
Finally, we used our extended framework to analyze the impact of two different policy 
measures,  a  100  percent  increase  in  DP  and  a  tightening  of  payment  limits  as  proposed  by 
Senators Charles Grassley and Byron Dorgan in the 109th Congress.. While the tightening of 
payment limits is likely to have no effect on average sized farmers, our results showed that, in 
the  presence  of  credit  constraints,  DP  have  important  and  nonnegligible  production  effects. 
Indeed, when farmers are liquidity constrained, the presence of these payments has a “collateral-
enhancement effect” such that more production can take place even though the actual liquidity of 
the farmer does not change. For example, in the baseline scenario, in the low allowable debt 
case, doubling DP increased planted acres by between 1.5 and 3.8 percent in the high and low 
liquidity cases, respectively. In the high allowable debt case, these values increased to between 
2.4 and 5.7 percent, respectively. This finding is extremely important as decoupled payments are 
typically viewed as a non-distorting means of supporting agriculture. But if the payments alter 
the  farmers’  optimal  choices  and  result  in  additional  crop  production,  prices  and  returns 
decrease,  and so they fail in supporting farm household income. The  causal relationship we 
observe  between  payments  and  acreage  may  also  undermine  the  economic  rationale  of  the 
WTO’s green box category of support, which specifically requires support to not distort trade or 
at most cause minimal distortion. Finally, there is the potential for environmental consequences 
if the payments do stimulate production.  
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A.  Appendix 
Table A.1. Scenario 1: Baseline 
γ = 0.13 Acres 299.03 535.53 772.03
Borrowing ($) 7,224.29 8,089.14 8,953.98
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 94,764.37 8,186.99 124,033.35 13,581.28 153,302.32 19,684.86
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 2,497.41 3,797.84 4,472.62 6,801.57 6,447.83 9,805.30
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64
γ = 0.25 Acres 354.41 597.54 840.67
Borrowing ($) 12,856.91 14,396.05 15,935.19
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 95,916.34 9,319.11 125,323.22 15,146.14 154,730.10 21,504.68
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 2,959.92 4,501.19 4,990.50 7,589.12 7,021.08 10,677.05
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64
Variables
Liquidity scenarios
Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
 
Table A.2. Scenario 2: Low costs and rents 
γ = 0.13 Acres 635.66 1,039.88 1,444.10
Borrowing ($) 15,601.92 17,080.07 18,558.23
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 191,399.14 16,123.36 241,424.52 26,848.41 291,449.91 37,839.42
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 5,308.87 8,073.27 8,684.82 13,207.12 12,060.77 18,340.98
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64
γ = 0.25 Acres 844.22 1,268.20 1,520.00
Borrowing ($) 28,329.55 31,013.54 23,189.88
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 204,646.84 21,599.12 255,927.33 33,040.75 296,270.82 39,914.97
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61 10,597.34 6,412.61
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 7,050.71 10,722.11 10,591.69 16,106.93 12,694.64 19,304.91
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64 3.00 0.64
Variables
Liquidity scenarios
Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
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Table A.3. Scenario 3: Low costs and prices 
γ = 0.13 Acres 646.236532 1050.402173 1454.567813
Borrowing ($) 16,247.35 17,722.08 19,196.82
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 191,296.17 14,183.70 236,588.57 23,003.29 281,869.88 31,803.82
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 28,659.36 12,117.79 46,583.34 19,696.43 64,507.32 27,275.07
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39
γ = 0.25 Acres 863.37 1,287.24 1,520.00
Borrowing ($) 29,498.17 32,175.64 23,189.88
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 202,547.60 18,920.67 248,860.27 28,172.07 285,249.10 33,210.15
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 38,288.84 16,189.34 57,086.86 24,137.55 67,409.11 28,502.02
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39




Table A.4. Scenario 4: Low costs and high prices 
γ = 0.13
Acres 643.44 1,052.61 1,461.78
Borrowing ($) 16,076.78 17,856.90 19,637.02
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 209,184.26 26,055.05 275,832.61 43,510.98 342,480.96 61,032.48
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 2,241.96 4,257.87 2,241.96 4,257.87 2,241.96 4,257.87
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 329.18 1,922.06 538.50 3,144.32 747.83 4,366.58
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 4.20 0.90 4.20 0.90 4.20 0.90
γ = 0.25
Acres 863.17 1,296.68 1,520.00
Borrowing ($) 29,486.23 32,751.13 23,189.88
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 231,899.77 35,415.24 301,063.32 53,958.49 348,499.48 63,527.71
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 2,241.96 4,257.87 2,241.96 4,257.87 2,241.96 4,257.87
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 441.59 2,578.44 663.36 3,873.38 777.61 4,540.49
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 4.20 0.90 4.20 0.90 4.20 0.90
Variables
Liquidity scenarios
Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
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Table A.5. Scenario 5: Low costs and prices, and high yields 
γ = 0.13
Acres 663.10 1,077.67 1,482.98
Borrowing ($) 17,276.72 19,386.26 20,930.41
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 222,910.47 20,338.81 287,940.68 32,969.41 350,799.21 43,807.64
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 41,170.38 17,407.72 66,909.80 28,290.89 92,073.99 38,930.86
Yields (bu/acre) 56.11 10.59 56.11 10.59 56.11 10.59
Prices ($) 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39
γ = 0.25
Acres 905.17 1,338.08 1,520.00
Borrowing ($) 32,049.31 35,278.05 23,189.88
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 246,675.42 27,736.41 313,102.91 40,345.13 354,100.38 44,620.77
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 56,199.88 23,762.51 83,077.97 35,127.14 94,372.75 39,902.82
Yields (bu/acre) 56.11 10.59 56.11 10.59 56.11 10.59
Prices ($) 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39
Variables
Liquidity scenarios
Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
 
Table A.6. Scenario 6: Low costs, prices and CARA preferences 
γ = 0.13
Acres 357.65 608.00 729.60
Borrowing ($) -1,364.10 -9,275.95 -25,045.07
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 176,342.08 7,901.17 213,664.21 13,350.06 244,314.64 16,001.85
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 15,860.97 6,706.36 26,963.65 11,400.81 32,356.37 13,680.97
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39
γ = 0.25
Acres 357.65 608.00 729.60
Borrowing ($) -1,364.10 -9,275.95 -25,045.07
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Wealth ($) 176,342.08 7,901.17 213,664.21 13,350.06 244,314.64 16,001.85
Direct Payments ($) 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 - 9,792.64 -
Counter-Cyclical Payments ($) 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09 17,384.65 900.09
Loan Deficiency Payments ($) 15,860.97 6,706.36 26,963.65 11,400.81 32,356.37 13,680.97
Yields (bu/acre) 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56 40.08 7.56
Prices ($) 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39 1.80 0.39
Variables
Liquidity scenarios
Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
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Table A.7. The effects of doubling DP on selected variables, low allowable debt 
γ = 0.13
$9,792.64 $19,585.28 $9,792.64 $19,585.28 $9,792.64 $19,585.28
Variable Scenarios (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 299.19            310.61            535.52            546.92            771.34            782.71           
2 635.25            654.68            1,035.83         1,055.06         1,431.64         1,450.60        
3 645.78            665.20            1,046.20         1,065.43         1,422.12         1,422.05        
4 642.91            662.56            1,047.53         1,066.93         1,446.26         1,465.33        
5 662.34            682.22            1,071.25         1,090.83         1,468.79         1,487.76        
6 357.65            357.65            608.00            608.00            729.60            729.60           
1 7,240.88 8,402.67 8,088.15 9,247.93 8,883.17 10,039.83
2 15,577.14 16,762.76 16,832.65 18,006.58 17,797.55 18,954.93
3 16,219.48 17,404.69 17,465.84 18,639.26 17,216.36 17,212.34
4 16,044.59 17,243.34 17,546.61 18,730.87 18,689.87 19,853.79
5 17,230.16 18,443.11 18,994.53 20,189.49 20,065.04 21,222.13
6 -1,364.10 -1,364.11 -9,275.95 -9,275.95 -25,045.07 -25,045.07
1 95,333.61 105,362.72 124,008.76 133,969.81 150,915.24 160,771.18
2 190,599.36 201,438.25 233,092.11 243,535.88 265,749.36 275,632.94
3 190,477.04 201,098.06 228,757.82 239,017.04 258,069.11 267,860.29
4 208,025.71 219,592.94 264,265.36 275,290.64 307,071.89 317,335.70
5 221,519.22 232,992.48 275,704.06 286,623.48 316,041.21 326,181.23
6 176,842.32 186,635.07 213,214.87 223,008.30 242,747.18 252,541.94
1 2,536.20 2,631.63 4,471.51 4,562.37 6,287.48 6,371.27
2 5,256.50 5,406.69 8,124.65 8,248.21 10,328.97 10,414.74
3 28,344.94 29,139.49 43,497.12 44,148.65 54,614.57 54,612.95
4 325.62 334.90 502.29 509.87 636.76 641.95
5 40,631.93 41,763.98 62,082.04 62,995.78 78,021.39 78,629.36
6 16,051.59 16,051.59 26,785.16 26,785.16 31,736.45 31,736.45
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 6 8 160 177
6 0 0 0 0 0 0








Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
 
Note: The number of LDP limit hits is the number of replications the limit on LDP was reached. 41 
Table A.8. The effects of doubling DP on selected variables, high allowable debt 
γ = 0.25
$9,792.64 $19,585.28 $9,792.64 $19,585.28 $9,792.64 $19,585.28
Variable Scenarios (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 354.68            375.00            597.30            617.54            838.85            858.99           
2 840.94            875.78            1,253.68         1,287.73         1,497.41         1,497.34        
3 859.78            894.58            1,272.02         1,306.02         1,422.12         1,422.05        
4 858.84            894.29            1,277.84         1,312.29         1,520.00         1,520.00        
5 898.89            934.97            1,319.95         1,353.95         1,520.00         1,520.00        
6 357.65            357.65            608.00            608.00            729.60            729.60           
1 12,884.87 14,951.06 14,371.86 16,430.56 15,750.07 17,797.73
2 28,129.62 30,255.69 30,127.38 32,205.40 21,811.20 21,807.31
3 29,278.92 31,402.68 31,246.27 33,321.43 17,216.56 17,212.42
4 29,221.40 31,385.05 31,601.45 33,704.16 23,189.88 23,189.88
5 31,665.58 33,867.77 34,171.60 36,246.15 23,189.88 23,189.88
6 -1,364.10 -1,364.11 -9,275.95 -9,275.95 -25,045.07 -25,045.07
1 96,462.58 106,651.64 124,874.00 134,920.12 151,206.90 161,042.15
2 200,887.41 212,225.97 239,059.36 249,480.09 265,937.68 275,728.47
3 198,812.54 209,772.26 232,845.22 242,964.46 258,069.11 267,860.29
4 226,362.46 238,887.34 276,784.91 288,019.16 308,669.41 318,460.09
5 240,098.77 252,415.09 287,509.01 298,451.19 316,889.24 326,679.92
6 176,842.32 186,635.07 213,214.87 223,008.30 242,747.18 252,541.94
1 2,998.30 3,166.45 4,960.45 5,118.77 6,779.10 6,922.89
2 6,794.10 7,041.84 9,430.79 9,615.19 10,617.75 10,617.48
3 36,790.77 38,093.20 50,608.88 51,570.35 54,614.65 54,612.98
4 424.00 439.31 585.73 596.91 656.12 656.12
5 53,554.06 55,407.84 72,737.49 74,021.71 79,627.89 79,627.89
6 16,051.59 16,051.59 26,785.16 26,785.16 31,736.45 31,736.45
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 61 78 203 203
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acres







Low liquidity ($23,189.88) Average liquidity ($46,379.76) High liquidity ($69,569.64)
 
Note: The number of LDP limit hits is the number of replications the limit on LDP was reached. 